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ABSTRACT
We address the problem of scaling authentication for nam-
ing, routing, and end-entity certification to a global environ-
ment in which authentication policies and users’ sets of trust
roots vary widely. The current mechanisms for authenti-
cating names (DNSSEC), routes (BGPSEC), and end-entity
certificates (TLS) do not support a coexistence of authenti-
cation policies, affect the entire Internet when compromised,
cannot update trust root information efficiently, and do not
provide users with the ability to make flexible trust deci-
sions. We propose a Scalable Authentication Infrastructure
for Next-generation Trust (SAINT), which partitions the In-
ternet into groups with common, local trust roots, and iso-
lates the effects of a compromised trust root. SAINT re-
quires groups with direct routing connections to cross-sign
each other for authentication purposes, allowing diverse au-
thentication policies while keeping all entities globally veri-
fiable. SAINT makes trust root management a central part of
the network architecture, enabling trust root updates within
seconds and allowing users to make flexible trust decisions.
SAINT operates without a significant performance penalty
and can be deployed alongside existing infrastructures.
1. INTRODUCTION
Alice lives in the Republic of Mythuania and frequently trav-
els around the world for business purposes. In her business
dealings, she frequently communicates with her clients and
with her banks, which are located all over the world. For the
security of these communications to client and bank web-
sites, Alice primarily relies on three mechanisms: DNSSEC [4,
5] to authenticate name-to-address mappings in DNS records,
RPKI and BGPSEC [27, 28] to authenticate routes used to
reach the sites, and TLS [15] to authenticate the public keys
used to establish a confidential connection to the sites. These
mechanisms rely on trust roots, which are assumed to be
trustworthy, and follow one of two models: monopoly (the
entire system has a single trust root) and oligarchy (users
configure many trust roots of equal authority).
Unfortunately, these models both suffer from shortcom-
ings that detrimentally affect Alice’s communication secu-
rity. The monopoly model unrealistically expects users to
trust a single global root, such as ICANN for DNSSEC. Al-
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Figure 1: Authentication triangle for routes, names, and
end-entities.
ice must assume that ICANN correctly certifies DNS records
if she wants to have confidence in DNSSEC. As a Mythua-
nian citizen, Alice may want to select a different set of trust
roots from a citizen of Oceania1, but under the monopoly
model neither citizen has a choice of trust roots. Moreover,
the global root is a single point of failure in the monopoly
model, which is particularly worrying in light of recent state-
level attacks [10, 14, 17, 18, 20, 40].
The oligarchy model, on the other hand, gives all trust
roots equal, global authority, allowing every trust root to
certify information all over the world (consider the exam-
ple of root certificate authorities (CAs) in TLS). However,
this unfettered global authority lacks an isolation property:
any compromised trust root can affect authentication for any
entity in the world, leading to weakest-link security. Under
this model, Alice has difficulties evaluating the trustworthi-
ness of the many trust roots, preventing her from effectively
defending herself against compromised trust roots by ceas-
ing to trust them. Together with the inability to choose trust
roots, we say that Alice lacks trust agility [31], the ability to
select and easily modify trust roots. Even if she can select
trust roots in TLS, Alice may cut off access to some sites by
deselecting certain trust roots, illustrating a need for global
verifiability with trust agility.
Because Alice travels frequently, she faces additional prob-
lems with today’s authentication mechanisms. Due to the
1This is the fictional state in George Orwell’s novel 1984.
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fact that some trust roots in systems such as TLS may only
certify information in some parts of the world, Alice may
have to trust these roots when in the respective parts of the
world, requiring her to constantly change her set of trust
roots. In contrast, she should have trust mobility, the ability
to use the same set of trust roots wherever she is in the world.
To evaluate her confidence in a chain of signatures authenti-
cating a piece of information, she should have transparent
authentication, knowing which trust roots are involved in
certifying the information. Finally, in order to quickly ob-
tain updated trust root information in the face of a compro-
mise or change, Alice should be able to learn of any changes
to her trust roots and obtain up-to-date information quickly
and easily, a property we call update efficiency.
To address the above problems, we propose a Scalable
Authentication Infrastructure for Next-generation Trust (SAINT),
a series of architectural design changes to current authen-
tication mechanisms (specifically DNSSEC, BGPSEC, and
TLS). Using Alice’s example, we demonstrate how authenti-
cation in SAINT provides stronger guarantees and additional
properties over today’s Internet. In designing SAINT, we
make the following contributions:
• We propose isolation domains (ISDs), which partition
the Internet into groups sharing common sets of trust
roots, and scope trust root authority to these ISDs. The
separation of ISDs allows Alice to select an ISD as a
set of trust roots, enabling trust agility, and the scoped
authority of each ISD’s trust roots enables isolated au-
thentication.
• We design trust root configuration (TRC) files, net-
work messages containing trust root information. The
distribution channel of these files is the same as that of
routing messages, providing update efficiency. Addi-
tionally, these files allow Alice to quickly obtain and
use new trust root information, enabling trust agility.
• We require cross-signing of trust roots between ISDs
sharing a routing link using special certificates. This
requirement enables global verifiability, so that Alice
can verify any entity to which she has a routing path.
The certificates used for cross-signing allow Alice to
see the ISDs through which she is authenticating her
destination, enabling transparent authentication.
• We separate authentication for routing and service en-
tities, preventing circular dependencies in authenticat-
ing routes. This separation also enables trust agility
and mobility, allowing Alice’s trust decisions for ser-
vice entities to apply anywhere in the world.
2. BACKGROUND
We provide a brief overview of existing authentication in-
frastructures relevant to this work and their shortcomings.
DNSSEC [4, 5] was created to authenticate DNS responses
and thus to prevent cache poisoning and other attacks against
DNS security. ICANN operates the DNSSEC root sign-
ing key, which authenticates the public keys associated with
.com, .org, etc. In turn, these keys authenticate the next
level of the DNS hierarchy. Clients can authenticate the
DNS responses by starting from the root key and validating
step-by-step the entire signature chain.
Shortcomings. The single root of trust in DNSSEC im-
plies that the entire world is required to trust the root key,
even though the world cannot agree on a single trusted en-
tity. Furthermore, despite the measures taken to protect the
root key from compromise, the key is still a single point of
failure for DNSSEC.
BGPSEC [29] and RPKI [3] constitute a standard to pro-
tect BGP update messages against unwarranted modifica-
tions. BGPSEC relies on RPKI for prefix and router certifi-
cates. RPKI enables the authentication of AS numbers and
IP address spaces. In RPKI, each Regional Internet Reg-
istry (RIR) serves as a trust anchor and signs certificates cor-
responding to resources, such as autonomous system (AS)
numbers and IP addresses, issued by that regional registry.
For example, ARIN signs a delegation for an address space
provided to AT&T, which in turn signs a delegation to a cus-
tomer of its subspace. The same process occurs with AS
numbers. Verifiers use the trust anchor managed by each
RIR to verify the delegation chain of certificates for AS num-
bers and address spaces. Before the owner of an address
block advertises a prefix in BGPSEC, it can use the address
block certificate to sign a Route Origin Authorization (ROA)
to an initial AS. Each AS on the path adds a signature of its
own and the following AS number, called a route attesta-
tion in S-BGP [23]. The route attestations, together with AS
number and address block certificates, enable validation of
the path in BGPSEC.
Shortcomings. RPKI’s validation process in BGPSEC suf-
fers from circular dependencies. To transfer routing infor-
mation, BGPSEC peers use the UPDATE message which
contains signatures. The certificate chains for the signa-
ture validation are stored at each RIR’s RPKI server. Hence,
validation of the UPDATE message requires each BGPSEC
router to fetch the certificates directly from the RIRs or from
its local server, resulting in slow update propagation.
SSL/TLS [15] were created to secure web connections be-
tween browsers and web servers. A web site is authenticated
through an X.509 certificate that the web site obtains from a
Certification Authority (CA). Each browser stores the public
root key of each trusted CA, and uses one of these root keys
to validate a server’s certificate.
Shortcomings. Numerous security issues exist with the
key infrastructure since current browsers trust around 650
root CA keys [16]. Additionally, CAs have global jurisdic-
tion and consequently any compromised CA can issue a fake
certificate for any server in the entire Internet. Recent attacks
on CAs have underscored the fact that even the most widely-
used CAs suffer from such vulnerabilities, leading to Man-
in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks on high-profile sites [32].
SCION [41] is an isolation architecture for inter-domain rout-
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ing in the Internet. The provided isolation allows so-called
trust domains (TDs) to distinguish between connections orig-
inating from inside or outside the domain, and can guarantee
that the path of communication between two entities in a do-
main remains completely in that domain. TDs are formed
from ASes that are naturally grouped along jurisdictional
boundaries and who can agree on common roots of trust for
routing information. These boundaries protect misbehavior
in one TD from affecting routing in another TD.
Shortcomings. SCION does not provide authentication for
name lookups or end entities, and does not specify mech-
anisms for the update or revocation of keys in the routing
architecture. Additionally, SCION ties users to the TD in
which they are located for all authentication, forcing them to
trust their own TD core (which serve as routing authorities)
for all authentication.
Additional related work is discussed in Section 13.
3. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Our goal is to design global infrastructures allowing a user
(Alice) to authenticating routes, names, and EE certificates
(such as TLS certificates) for a server (Bob) in the Internet.
In a global environment such as the Internet, Alice does not
trust all trust roots in the environment, and she and Bob may
not even have any trust roots in common. The trust roots
may differ in functionality and scope: some may authenti-
cate routes and others names, and some may be global and
some local. We want to minimize global authority, allow
trust agility and mobility while maintaining global verifia-
bility, and allow Alice to evaluate the trustworthiness of in-
formation being authenticated.
Desired properties. In order to effectively the above au-
thentication problems, a network architecture should have
the following properties:
• Isolated authentication. The compromise of a trust
root should be limited in scope. In particular, if Al-
ice and Bob share trust roots for some information, no
other trust root should be able to affect authentication
of that information.
• Trust agility. Alice should have a clear, understand-
able choice over her trust roots. This choice should
be easily modifiable at any time, with changes taking
effect immediately (within seconds).
• Trust mobility. Alice’s trust decisions should remain
the same no matter where she is in the network. In
other words, moving to different locations in the net-
work should not require Alice to change her trust roots.
• Global verifiability. As in the current Internet, Alice
should be able to authenticate any entity in the Internet
that can be reached and has authentication information
such as a name or EE certificate, even if its trust deci-
sion differs from hers.
• Transparent authentication. Alice should know when
trust roots other than her own are certifying informa-
tion that she verifies. In particular, for a chain of sig-
natures Alice should be able to determine which trust
roots are responsible for each signature.
• Update efficiency. Changes to trust root information
(e.g., new keys and revocations) should take effect quickly
(within minutes). In particular, Alice should be able to
detect and obtain new information without requiring
software updates.
Adversary model. Our adversary is an individual or organi-
zation whose goal is to convince Alice of false information
for a route, name, or EE certificate. To achieve this goal,
the adversary can actively suppress, change, replay, or inject
messages into client-server communication, and might also
gain access to the private keys of trust roots in one domain.
However, besides these capabilities, the adversary cannot
break cryptographic primitives such as public-key encryp-
tion and hash functions.
Other assumptions. In order for Alice to successfully ver-
ify authentication information, she must also be able to ver-
ify a set of trusted public keys which can then be used to
bootstrap trust in other keys used during authentication. We
therefore assume that users like Alice can verify an initial set
of public keys through an out-of-band mechanism.
4. SAINT OVERVIEW
In this section, we highlight important features of SAINT.
We provide intuitive explanations of how these features ac-
complish the desired properties mentioned in Section 3 and
how they fit into the overall SAINT architecture.
4.1 Isolation Domains (ISDs)
The Internet consists of a diverse assortment of groups, or
domains, each with its own set of trusted parties and individ-
ual policies regarding routing, naming and EE certification.
We make these differences a central part of the SAINT archi-
tecture in order to achieve isolated authentication. SAINT
groups hosts, routers, and networks into isolation domains
(ISDs), such as those shown in Figure 2. SAINT’s ISDs
are inspired by SCION’s trust domains [41] and leverage
SCION’s routing infrastructure. However, SAINT’s ISDs
provide additional authentication mechanisms for naming
and EE certification.
An ISD is a collection of ASes with a common set of trust
roots (see Figure 4). These trust roots manage authentication
within their ISD, including management of routing, naming,
and EE certification policies, but are not authorities outside
of the ISDs. The structure of ISDs attempts to model ex-
isting trust relationships between humans by grouping those
with similar trust decisions together and by protecting users
from misconfigurations or breaches of trust outside these
“circles of trust” where other trust decisions and policies
hold. Thanks to ISDs, Alice can select her roots of trust
and when communicating within her own ISD, she can stay
protected from compromised trust roots outside of her ISD.
Section 5 describes the structure of ISDs in more detail.
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Figure 2: Two isolation domains with individual trust
roots. The trust roots are illustrated in Figure 4. The
solid lines indicate provider-to-customer relations; the
dashed lines indicate peering links.
In practice, ISDs can represent groups of various scales,
such as companies, conglomerates, or countries. ISD-level
policies will vary greatly by the scale of the ISD, since cor-
porate policies often contain much more detail than country-
wide laws. In this paper we use countries as examples of
ISDs for several reasons: (1) international boundaries ap-
proximately map to DNS naming boundaries, which are also
separated in SAINT, (2) national data privacy laws provide
a reasonable example of security policies in top-level ISDs,
and (3) the resulting set of domains represents an easily-
understood choice among possible sets of trust roots, since
users can more easily understand what it means to evaluate
and trust a country (representing a set of trust roots) rather
than doing so with individual trust roots.
4.2 Trust Root Configuration (TRC) Files
Trust root management in SAINT is handled by TRC files,
which contain information about an ISD’s trust roots, such
as their public keys (see Section 6.2 for more details). TRC
files are disseminated as network messages along the same
channels as routing messages and DNS responses (see Sec-
tion 6.3), providing update efficiency. Because routing mes-
sages are required to maintain connectivity, new TRC files
can quickly propagate throughout the network in case a trust
root is compromised. This mechanism allows Alice to quickly
obtain up-to-date trust root information.
In addition to the above distribution mechanisms, TRC
files can also be downloaded and chosen by the users as a
new set of trust roots. Since a TRC file contains all of the
necessary trust root information, a user like Alice can easily
switch to a different set of trust roots by simply obtaining
and selecting a different TRC file. In essence, SAINT pro-
vides trust agility by allowing users to easily modify their
trust decisions at any time.
TRC files contain trust root information for a given ISD
and thereby enable transparent authentication. Namely, when
a trust root signs the information of another ISD’s trust root
(as explained below), it does so by signing the TRC file of
the other ISD. Thus a chain of signatures clearly indicates
domain boundaries by design. Alice can use this knowledge
of ISD boundaries to evaluate the trustworthiness of this sig-
nature chain and determine whether or not to accept the au-
thenticated information.
4.3 Cross-Signing Trust Roots
If we consider ISDs as countries, then we can clearly see
that not all ISDs’ trust roots will cross-certify one another,
and it is unrealistic to expect countries to do so. Rather, we
only require the trust roots of two ISDs to cross-certify one
another if they share routing links, that is, if they are phys-
ically connected and route traffic through one another. This
requirement ensures that the existence of a routing path im-
plies the existence of a chain of signatures for a name or EE
certificate, providing global verifiability by allowing Alice
to verify this information for any entity she can reach (see
Section 7 for more details).
This cross-signing requirement also helps to provide mo-
bility: no matter where users are located, they can authenti-
cate service information (names and EE certificates) starting
from their own trust roots (named in their “home” TRC file)
to the ISD of the entity whose information they are verify-
ing. Thus as long as Alice can reach her home ISD from the
ISD in which she is located, she can use her existing trust
decision for authentication anywhere in the world.
4.4 Separation of Authentication Types
SAINT separates routing authentication from service authen-
tication (which certifies names and EE certificates). Because
authentic routes are required to fetch necessary information
during name lookups and EE certificate handshakes, we treat
routing as a separate authentication mechanism. Moreover,
we note that authentication of routes cannot rely on fetching
external information, as this would itself require authentic
routes and thus create a circular dependency.
The separation of routing and service authentication also
helps provide trust mobility in SAINT. We observe that users’
physical locations indeed influence their routing authentica-
tion; in particular, a route from Alice to Bob must be authen-
ticated by trust roots of the ISDs in which Alice and Bob are
located. However, this requirement does not hold for service
authentication; thus Alice can use the trust roots of an ISD
of her choosing to completely bypass the ISD in which she
is located to authenticate names or EE certificates, providing
trust mobility and greater resilience against MitM attacks.
5. ISOLATION DOMAINS
We now discuss isolation domains in more detail. We be-
gin by describing the physical layout of ISDs along with the
structure of the namespace and the address space in SAINT.
We then present the concept of trust anchor ISDs, which pro-
vide starting points for the authentication of routes, names,
and EE certificates.
5.1 ISD Structure
An ISDs is made up of multiple networks, or ASes, as shown
in Figure 2, with ISDs connecting to one another to en-
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Figure 3: Namespace structure in SAINT. Solid lines in-
dicate hierarchical relations, and dashed lines indicate
redirections.
able Internet-wide connectivity. Similarly to trust domains
in SCION, SAINT arranges ASes hierarchically within an
ISD by customer-provider relationships. The ASes in the
top tier (those with no providers) are referred to as the ISD
core and serve as the trust roots for routing (see Figure 4 and
Section 6.1 for more details).
The connectivity of ASes in SAINT is similar to the cur-
rent BGP-based relations: ISDs are primarily connected by
links between ISD core ASes (similar to BGP transit links
between tier-1 ISPs), but can also be connected by links be-
tween lower-tier ASes (similar to BGP provider-customer
links and peering links). Paths between ISD cores are de-
termined by a simple routing protocol among the core ASes
of each ISD. Based on our analysis of the current Internet
(Section 11), we expect that there will be on the order of
several hundred core ASes in total. Therefore, in running
such a protocol we do not worry about significant overhead
or scalability.
5.2 DNS Namespace
Each ISD has the autonomy to manage its own namespace.
We structure SAINT’s global namespace as a collection of
top-level domains (TLDs) bound by an inter-domain web of
trust [42] (as shown in Figure 3), rather than by a global
root zone as is done in DNSSEC. However, SAINT’s name
resolution process is similar to that of DNSSEC.
Each SAINT DNS root server answers queries for hosts
within its ISD. An ISD’s namespace supports one of two
top-level domain types:
• Regional TLDs in SAINT correspond to a specific ISD.
In the example of Figure 3, the TLD .us represents the
United States ISD, whereas .uk represents the United
Kingdom ISD. In order to provide transparency, the
DNS server responsible for a regional TLD guarantees
that any address record (similar to A records in DNS)
maps to an address within the corresponding ISD.
• Generic TLDs such as .com and .org, by contrast,
are not bound to any specific ISD, and can thus name
an entity located anywhere in the world. However, a
name in a generic TLD can only map a redirection to
another name, thereby ensuring that only names under
regional TLDs map to addresses (and only within the
TLD’s corresponding ISD). This guarantee provides
domain transparency during DNS lookups. Details about
name resolution for generic TLDs are in Appendix 15.
We expect that today’s ccTLDs such as .us and .uk will
continue to operate as regional TLDs under SAINT. Coun-
tries such as Tuvalu (whose ccTLD is the popular .tv) may
choose to operate as a generic TLD and continue to sell
names that map all over the world, but must do so through
redirections to other names.
5.3 Address Space
We define an address in SAINT as a 3-tuple of the form
(I,A,e), where I represents an ISD identifier, A represents
an AS identifier (ASID), and e represents an endpoint identi-
fier EID. For example, if Alice wants to reach Bob, who has
the EID 42ac6d in AS 567 and ISD I, she would contact the
address (I,567,42ac6d). In contrast to the current Internet,
AS numbers and EIDs do not have significance outside of
their respective ISDs and ASes, and thus can have any for-
mat. An EID, for example, can be an IPv4, IPv6, MAC, or
self-certifying address.
Registry servers in ISDs (described in Section 6.1) as-
sign ASIDs to ASes, and similar servers in each AS issue
EIDs to endhosts. Due to the local significance of ASIDs
and EIDs, (I,A,e) and (J ,A,e) are distinct addresses even
though both have the same ASID and EID. This addressing
scheme allows full address to be globally unique while giv-
ing ISDs and ASes the autonomy to manage addressing as
well as names within their own realm of control.
The above addressing system also allows for interoper-
ability with the current IP addressing and AS numbering
schemes while simultaneously enabling local deployments
of other proposed addressing schemes. For example, some
ISDs may choose to retain the current AS numbering and IP
addressing schemes, while others may opt to provide ASes
with human-readable identifiers and endpoints with IPv6 ad-
dresses.
Similarly to ASIDs, endpoint addresses (since only used
locally in intra-AS routing) do not need to be globally al-
located like the current IP address space. Since the routing
authentication infrastructure only handles inter-AS routes,
SAINT does not bind the endhost address space to public
keys as RPKI does. Instead, forwarding from an edge router
to an endpoint address is resolved and handled entirely within
an AS.
5.4 Trust Anchor ISDs
Trust anchors in the current Internet, such as IANA for RPKI
and BGPSEC, ICANN for DNSSEC, and root CAs in TLS,
represent starting points for authenticating information. Sim-
ilarly, trust anchor ISDs are starting points for authenticating
routes, names, and EE certification in SAINT. Due to the
separation of authentication by type, Alice can anchor her
trust for authenticating routing and service information in
5
MI
J
RSM
PSM
K
ISD Core
Path
Server
Registry
Server
DNS Root
Servers
Root CA
Servers
Routing Trust Roots
AS
Endhost / Server
Service Trust Roots
Figure 4: Logical and physical placements of trust
rootsin an ISD.
separate ISDs.
As discussed in Section 4.4, for routing purposes the trust
roots of the ISD’s in which Alice is currently located must
certify all of her routes. However, Alice can select the trust
roots of any ISD to authenticate service information (names
and EE certificates). We call this ISD Alice’s trust anchor
ISD. Alice choice of this ISD can be easily changed at any
time (as described in Section 6.3). An example of such trust
bootstrapping is provided in Section 9.
6. TRUST ROOTS
In this section, we cover what entities serve as trust roots and
how trust roots are configured for an ISD. We also discuss
how we update trust root information using network-level
messages, and how this incorporation of trust management
into the network allows for fast updates of trust root infor-
mation. Finally, we describe our scheme of separating trust
roots by ISD, and how separated categories of authentication
enable trust agility.
6.1 Trusted Parties
Trust roots sign authentication information for routes, names,
or EE certificates, and set policies governing the ISD. These
policies may include information such as preferences for cer-
tain encryption or signature algorithms or constraints on cer-
tificate validity. A trust root is an authority for either routing
or service authentication (see Figure 4).
Because a trust root is only an authority in its own ISD, a
compromised trust root cannot enable the impersonation of
servers in other ISDs. Scoping trust root authority to the ISD
level protects Alice and Bob’s communication from many
compromises in other ISDs and provides guarantees to Alice
about authentication in her trust root ISD.
We classify trust roots into routing and service trust roots.
The routing trust roots consist of the following parties:
• The core ISPs are responsible for sending out route an-
nouncements, which are propagated from providers to
customers and establish cryptographically signed paths
from the recipient to the core.
• The path server stores and provides a lookup service
for mappings between an ASID and the AS’s down-
paths. These paths are registered by the ASes at the
core. The path server is co-located with and operated
by the core ISPs.
• The registry server issues and stores AS certificates
binding an ASID to its public key (called its AS key),
which are used to verify the signed paths provided by
the path server. Like the path server, the registry server
is co-located with and operated by the core ISPs.
The service trust roots consist of the trust roots for nam-
ing and for EE certification. The DNS root is the starting
point for verifying all names in the ISD’s namespace. The
DNS root also sets ISD-wide naming policies such as re-
served or forbidden domain names and allowed signature al-
gorithms to sign records. Because the failure of the DNS
root can block user connectivity in an ISD, the DNS root
should be highly robust and available, using mechanisms
such as distributed anycast schemes and placing servers in
the ISD core where they can be reached through highly avail-
able top-tier ASes.
The root CAs are the starting points for verifying EE cer-
tification information in an ISD. Root CAs in SAINT serve
the same purpose as they do in today’s PKIs by signing TLS
public-key certificates. However, they are restricted to only
signing EE certificates in ISDs in which they are root CAs.
They can also sign intermediate CA certificates as in to-
day’s TLS PKI. If the ISD uses other public-key infrastruc-
tures such as CT or AKI (see Section 12), then the trust
roots for EE certification also include public logs and au-
ditors/validators.
6.2 Trust Root Configuration (TRC) Files
As mentioned in Section 4.2, a TRC file specifies the trust
roots for an ISD, the public keys of those trust roots, and
the authentication policies of the ISD. It also specifies the
locations of the DNS root and TRC servers (described in
Section 6.3) to allow users to reach these servers without per-
forming DNS lookups. TRCs are created and managed by an
ISD’s trust roots and distributed through the routing mech-
anism. Specifically, a threshold of trust roots is required to
sign a new or updated TRC file, and the core ISPs distribute
the TRC file within the ISD through a broadcast mechanism
that we describe below.
The quorum of trust roots required to update the TRC file
is specified in the TRC file itself, providing the trust roots
with the autonomy to set their own threshold for altering the
TRC file. A higher threshold is more secure to a compro-
mise of multiple trust roots, but also reduces the efficiency
in updating TRC files. The TRC file also specifies a quo-
rum of trust roots that must sign a cross-signing certificate
to authenticate another ISD’s trust roots. Cross-signing cer-
tificates are described in more detail in Section 7.
TRC format. A TRC file is encoded as an XML file with the
fields shown in Figure 5. The version number and timestamp
ensure that users can verify information using recent policies
and trust root information. The public keys of the ISD’s trust
6
Field Description
isd ISD identifier
version Version of TRC file
time Timestamp
coreISPs List of core ISPs and their public keys
registryKey Root registry server’s public key
pathKey Path server’s public key
rootCAs List of root CAs and their public keys
rootDNSkey DNS root’s public key
rootDNSaddr DNS root’s address
trcServer TRC server’s address
quorum Number of trust roots that must sign new TRC
trcQuorum Number of trust roots that must sign an ISD cross-signing cert
policies Additional management policies for the ISD
signatures Signatures by a quorum of trust roots
Figure 5: Fields in a TRC file.
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Figure 6: Distribution mechanism for updated TRCs.
Arrows indicate sent network messages.
roots provide starting points for verifying routes, names, and
EE certificates. The TRC file may also contain the public
keys of additional entities (e.g., public logs in CT [26] or
AKI [24]). In order to allow users to easily reach the DNS
root of an ISD, the TRC also contains one or more addresses
for the ISD’s DNS root.
Policies. A TRC file can also specify additional policies re-
lated to ISD management. For example, these policies might
specify a minimum key length or required encryption algo-
rithms for all EE certificates in the ISD. Systems such as Po-
liCert [38] have proposed similar policies on a per-domain
basis; we leave a detailed design of additional ISD-wide
policies to future work.
Updating the TRC file. In the event that a TRC file needs
to be updated, the trust roots confer out of band to determine
what changes need to be made to the TRC file. Once they
have decided to update a TRC file, the trust roots sign the
new TRC file. Each of these signatures is appended to the
signatures section of the new TRC file, and sent when a
quorum of trust roots signs the TRC file. The trust roots can
also use group signatures [12] or threshold signatures [37] to
update the TRC file.
6.3 TRC Distribution and Management
Obtaining an initial TRC file. We envision that Alice will
most commonly obtain a initial TRC file of her provider’s
ISD when forming a service agreement. If Alice wants to
obtain a different ISD’s TRC file, she can contact the TRC
server of that ISD, a server that stores the TRC files and
cross-signing certificates (see Section 7) of other ISDs. The
TRC server’s address is in the TRC file of the ISD, allowing
Alice to directly query the server for other TRC files. In an
extreme case where Alice does not trust the provider or ISD,
she may download a TRC file from a publicly-accessible
mirror site or obtain one in person from a trusted colleague
or organization. Alice can also obtain a TRC file a priori if
she plans to join such an ISD with a new device.
Obtaining updated TRC files. ASes and users in an ISD
are informed of the latest version of the TRC file with each
routing announcement and DNS response. Thus, as long as
Alice has an Internet connection and performs DNS lookups,
she can quickly detect and obtain a new TRC. The version
number is part of each routing announcement, and a times-
tamped message signed by the trust roots accompanies each
DNS answer (to avoid re-signing every DNS record in the
ISD upon updating the TRC file). When Alice detects a new
TRC file, she can fetch the new file from the provider or
DNS root (see Figure 6).
Changing trust anchor ISDs. Besides the ability to select
trust roots as described in Section 5.4, trust agility also pro-
vides the ability to easily and quickly modify this selection.
The above methods of obtaining TRC files provide this no-
tion of trust agility, as Alice can change trust anchor ISDs
by simply obtaining a new TRC file. Under normal circum-
stances Alice can simply download a new TRC file from her
trust anchor ISD’s TRC server, but if for example she discov-
ers that her trust anchor ISD has been conducting state-level
surveillance, she can instead obtain the TRC file manually
or from an external server as described above.
7. CROSS-SIGNING
In this section, we provide a detailed discussion of cross-
signing in SAINT. We begin by describing cross-signing cer-
tificates, and then detail how these are used to enable inter-
ISD authentication and global verifiability. We then discuss
the tradeoff between global verifiability and the trustworthi-
ness of authenticated information, and how the authentica-
tion policies expressed in an ISD’s TRC file fits in this trade-
off.
7.1 Cross-Signing Certificates
In order to enable global verifiability, we require ISDs to is-
sue cross-signing certificates for its neighboring ISDs, that
is, ISDs with which they share routing links. The resulting
web of cross-signing between ISDs ensures that by follow-
ing a route from Alice’s ISD to Bob’s ISD, a corresponding
chain of signatures from Alice’s trust roots to Bob’s trust
roots will exist, forming a chain of signatures from Alice’s
trust roots to Bob. ISDs without direct routing connections
can also issue cross-signing certificates to one another, form-
ing further chains of signatures to enable authentication be-
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tween different ISDs directly.
A cross-signing certificate issued by I for J ’s trust roots
contains (a) a timestamp, (b) I, (c) the current version num-
ber of TI , (d) J , (e) the current version number of TJ , (f) a
hash of TJ , and (g) a signature by a quorum of I’s trust roots
(see Figure 7 for an explanation of notation). The version
numbers of the TRC files ensure that the trust roots’ public
keys can be checked against the appropriate versions of the
TRC files.
The ISD stores these certificates in its TRC server for its
users and also propagates the certificates along its inter-ISD
routing links to provide each ISD with the necessary infor-
mation to form a chain of signatures to a given destination
ISD. Alice can then query her trust anchor ISD to obtain
these chains of signatures and select one to authenticate in-
formation in Bob’s ISD.
7.2 Inter-ISD Authentication
When Alice, whose trust anchor ISD is K, wants to authen-
ticates Bob, who is in another ISDM, she needs to obtain
cross-signing certificates to form a chain of signatures from
K toM. While verifying Bob’s routes, name, and EE cer-
tificate, she obtains the appropriate cross-signing certificates
from K’s TRC server. If Alice is in an ISD I, then every
route from her to Bob will have a chain of signatures start-
ing at K, proceeding to the trust roots of I, then to the trust
roots ofM, and finally to Bob’s AS.
If K and M do not share routing links but have issued
cross-signing certificates to each other, Alice can verify Bob’s
name and EE certificate using K’s cross-signing certificate
for M. These cross-signing “shortcuts” allow Alice to au-
thenticate Bob’s information with fewer ISDs authenticating
information “in transit,” providing fewer opportunities for a
compromised trust root to disrupt authentication.
No matter whereM is, Alice is guaranteed to find a chain
of signatures toM and to Bob if she can find a route to Bob.
Since she must be able to contact K from I to obtain the ap-
propriate cross-signing certificates, she has a route between
K and I and can thus obtain cross-signing certificates from
K to I, and similarly for I andM. Though a chain of sig-
natures may cross many ISDs, Alice is guaranteed to find at
least one such chain.
Note that cross-signing certificates do not necessarily in-
dicate a trust relationship between ISDs; a cross-signing cer-
tificate instead only states: “These are the public keys of the
trust roots for the following ISD.” It is therefore up to Al-
ice to determine the trustworthiness of a chain of signatures
before accepting the information it certifies as authentic.
7.3 Authentication Policies
The above cross-signing requirement ensures that Alice can
authenticate Bob’s information regardless of which ISD he
is in. While a compromised trust root on a chain of signa-
tures from Alice to Bob can adversely affect authentication
by certifying false information, Alice’s trust anchor ISD K
can mitigate this risk through the use of ISD-wide policies
in the TRC file. These policies can also blacklist public
keys, such as those contained in known unauthorized cer-
tificates or those of compromised trusted authorities. Us-
ing such policies, K can protect Alice from compromises in
other ISDs. If others with K as their trust anchor ISD fre-
quently contact Bob or other destinations inM, then K may
form a cross-signing relationship with M to minimize the
risk of compromised trust roots in other ISDs.
ISDs face a tradeoff between enabling global verifiability
and protecting their users from compromises in other do-
mains. The default behavior in SAINT is to provide global
verifiability. As illustrated above, an ISD must explicitly
state any exceptions to this behavior in the policy field of its
TRC file. The ability to restrict the authentication of known
false information through policies provides a mechanism by
which an ISD can protect not only its own users, but also
users for whom a chain of signatures passes through the ISD.
8. SEPARATED AUTHENTICATION
In this section, we describe how SAINT separates routing
and service authentication. We first describe our motivation
for separating these two types of authentication, and then
discuss how this separation provides Alice with trust mobil-
ity.
8.1 Routing and Service Authentication
Authentication in SAINT is classified and separated into rout-
ing and service authentication (see Figure 1). We make this
separation in part because we observe that the authentication
of route information fundamentally differs from the authen-
tication of service information. In particular, routing authen-
tication cannot assume the existence of secure routes to ob-
tain any external information, and therefore an entity must
rely on pre-verified paths or be able to verify paths without
fetching external information. By contrast, service authen-
tication assumes the existence of authentic routes and thus
allows contacting external entities to obtain authentication
information.
Routing messages in SAINT propagate beginning from
the ISD core and follow provider-customer AS links. Un-
like in RPKI and BGPSEC, all necessary information (e.g.
AS certificates) are sent with the routing message, allowing
an AS to verify routing messages upon arrival. Moreover, in-
formation such as AS certificates are short-lived, eliminating
the need to propagate revocation information for AS keys.
By contrast, a DNS lookup, which falls under service au-
thentication, must use a route to reach one or more name-
servers and fetch the appropriate information for verifying a
name-to-address mapping. TLS features such as OCSP also
require contacting an external entity to determine the valid-
ity of an EE certificate. Due to this dependence, Alice must
verify routes to the ISD core of her current ISD I, and form
and verify routing paths from I to Bob’s ISDM before she
can authenticate Bob’s service information.
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Notation Name Use
Identifiers
X AS AS with ASID X
y Endhost an end-entity such as a client or server
ey EID locate endhost y within its AS and ISD
Z ISD ISD with identifier Z
Certificates
ACX AS cert bind X to AKX (signed by RS of X’s ISD)
ECy End-entity cert store CA-signed public key information during
connection setup
DCy CERT RR store CA-signed DNS binding between y and DKy
Keys
AKX AS key sign paths that can be used to reach X
DKy DNSKEY RR sign DNS resource records in DNSSEC
EKy End-entity key set up secure end-to-end connections, e.g., via TLS
K−1y Private key private key for public key Ky
Servers
PSY AS Path server contact ISD path server for clients in Y
PSZ ISD Path server maintain database of signed paths for ASes in Z
RSZ Registry server assign ASIDs and AS numbers in Z
Messages
PX Signed path set sent to PS of X’s ISD to register paths to reach X
TZ TRC file provide trust root information for Z
Figure 7: Notation.
8.2 Trust Mobility
Separating routing and service authentication also enables
trust mobility. Suppose that Alice checks into a hotel in
Oceania, a known surveillance state, and attempts to connect
to her hotel’s wireless Internet. If the Oceanian trust roots
are compromised by the government, then it is inevitable that
the government can see her packets themselves, as her phys-
ical location in Oceania enables the government to examine
her packets. In other words, Oceanian trust roots must cer-
tify her routes out of the Oceanian ISD and thus these trust
roots must be on the chain of signatures for routes from Al-
ice to any destination in the Internet.
With SAINT, however, Alice can chooseK as her trust an-
chor ISD for service authentication, since SAINT separates
routing and service authentication. Moreover, this choice
does not depend on Alice’s current location and thus applies
wherever Alice is in the Internet. In our example, this means
that Alice does not have to rely on signatures from the Ocea-
nian trust roots to verify Bob’s name or EE certificate, even
if she is connecting to the Internet from an Oceanian hotel.
9. AUTHENTICATION EXAMPLE
We now discuss the complete authentication process in SAINT.
We first describe setup steps for a server, such as joining an
ISD and registering domain names, routing paths, and EE
certificates. We then describe how Alice (the client) checks
the information that she receives about Bob (the server). We
use a to denote Alice and b to denote Bob. As previously
mentioned, Alice’s trust anchor ISD is K. Bob is part of
the AS B in MythuaniaM, whose ccTLD is .my. Figure 7
provides a list of the notation used.
9.1 AS Setup
Figure 8 depicts the steps of the AS setup process for AS B
in the Mythuanian ISDM:
1. RSM assigns the ASID B to Bob’s AS.
B
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Figure 8: Diagram for AS setup steps (Section 9.1).
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Figure 9: Diagram for server setup steps (Section 9.2).
2. B creates an AS key pair (AKB,AK−1B ).
3. B sends {B,AKB} to RSM.
4. RSM issues B an AS certificate ACB.
5. B receives the TRC file TM from its parent AS.
6. B receives SCION routing messages from its parent.
7. B selects a set of paths PB (signed with AK−1B ) and
sends {PB,ACB} to PSM.
9.2 Server Setup
Figure 9 shows the steps of the server setup process for Bob:
1. AS B assigns Bob the EID eb, making his address (M,B,eb).
2. Bob chooses the name b.my and creates a domain-
name key pair (DKb,DK−1b ).
3. Bob sends b.my and DKb to the .my operator to regis-
ter his name and key.2
4. The .my operator creates a delegation signer (DS) record
to point to DKb from the .my zone, as well as a record
mapping b.my to Bob’s nameserver.
5. Bob creates a mapping of www.b.my to (M,B,eb),
DKb, and resource record signature (RRSIG) record of
the mapping signed with DK−1b .
6. Bob creates an end-entity key pair (EKb,EK−1b ).
7. Bob sends {b,EKb} to a CA inM.
8. The CA issues Bob an EE certificate ECb = {b,EKb}K−1CA .
9. Bob creates a certificate DCb = {b.my,DKb}EK−1b , and
stores DCb along with ECb as a CERT record in his
nameserver.
9.3 Client Setup
2In practice, Bob will create multiple key pairs and use one of the
private keys to sign the others, but for simplicity we assume here
that Bob uses DKb both to sign his DNS zone information and to
self-sign DKb.
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Figure 10: Diagram for obtaining a TRC file (Sec-
tion 9.3).
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Figure 11: Client lookup and verification of server’s
name, route, and EE certificate (Section 9.4).
In order for Alice to verify information, she must first pos-
sess a TRC file to configure her set of trust roots. Even if
she does not have a TRC file, we assume that she can verify
a TRC file from her trust anchor ISD K. In fact, she can ver-
ify this TRC file in any ISD I— even if she does not trust I.
As illustrated in Figure 10, after connecting to the Internet in
I, Alice does the following to obtain and verify a TRC file:
1. Alice’s ISP (AS C) assigns her the EID ea, making her
address (I,C,ea). C also sends her the latest TRC file
TI for the ISD I.
2. Alice requests from PSC a path to the TRC server TSI
of I or TSK of K (if she knows the address).
3. PSC returns to Alice the path she requested.
4. Alice now contacts either TSI (4a in Figure 10) or TSK
(4b) and requests TK. In the case of 4b, Alice also
requests a cross-signing certificate for I from TSK to
ensure that all authentication (even for routes) begins
from TK.
5. If Alice contacted TSI , she receives TK (5a). Other-
wise, she receives TK and the cross-signing certificate
for I from TSK (5b).
We assume that Alice verifies the authenticity of TK through
an out-of-band mechanism, e.g., if she makes plans to travel
to I and considers it a “hostile” ISD, then Alice can obtain a
hash of the public keys of K’s trust roots a priori, or she can
obtain this information in an embassy of K within I.
9.4 Client Verification
Figure 11 illustrates the complete process that Alice executes
to authenticate Bob. We assume that Alice has completed
the client setup process and thus has TK to use as the starting
point for authenticating Bob. The authentication process is
as follows:
1. Alice begins by looking up www.b.my, and thus first
obtains TM. She contacts PSC to obtain a path to TSK.
2. PSC returns to Alice a set of paths that she can use to
reach TSK.
3. Alice contacts TSK to request TM.
4. TSK returns TM and a cross-signing certificate forM.
5. Alice contacts PSC to request a path to the DNS root
ofM, whose address she has from TM.
6. PSC returns to Alice a set of paths toM’s DNS root.
7. Alice contactsM’s DNS root to query www.b.my.
8. Alice performs DNSSEC resolution to obtain (M,B,eb)
as well as Bob’s domain and EE certs DCb and ECb.
9. Alice requests a path to Bob’s address from PSC.
10. PSC returns to Alice B’s AS certificate ACB and a set
of paths PB to reach B.
11. Alice contacts Bob to initiate the TLS handshake.
12. Bob sends Alice his EE certificate ECb.
Alice verifies that Bob’s EE public key EKb contained in
the EE certificate she obtained fromM’s DNS root matches
the EE public key she receives during the TLS handshake.
If the keys match, she proceeds with the TLS handshake to
establish a secure end-to-end connection with Bob.
Throughout this process, Alice verifies that valid authen-
tication paths exist for each entity she contacts: PSC, TSK,
M’s DNS root, B, and Bob. When she receives information
signed by the trust roots of an ISD other than K, Alice uses
the appropriate cross-signing certificate to verify the public
keys of the ISD’s trust roots, thus ensuring that all authenti-
cation ultimately begins with trust roots listed in the TRC of
her trust anchor ISD K.
Error handling. A verification failure at any stage in the
authentication process will prevent Alice from authenticat-
ing and establishing a connection to Bob. In the event that
the verification of a routing path fails, Alice will not be able
to reach Bob or entities such as DNS roots and TRC servers.
However, Alice likely cannot detect this failure from her
browser. In the event that the verification of Bob’s name-
to-address mapping fails, Alice will not know the address at
which she can reach Bob. While most modern browsers in-
dicate such a failure, Alice cannot proceed with verification
after such a failure. From the perspective of Alice’s browser,
a failure to verify Bob’s EE certificate is the most informa-
tive, as most modern browsers display the type of error that
occurred and in some cases provide the option to continue
with the connection anyway.
10. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
In this section, we describe our prototype implementation
of SAINT. We used this implementation to evaluate the per-
formance of authentication and trust root management func-
tions; we also discuss our evaluation results here.
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Figure 12: Architecture for endhost implementation.
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Figure 13: CDF of the percentage of vantage point ASes
using a new TRC after propagation from the core ISPs.
10.1 Implementation
We implemented the endhost side of SAINT (see Figure 12).
The main component of our implementation is the SAINT
daemon, which acts as a gateway between applications and
the network. The SAINT daemon includes SCION layer
support for packet encapsulation and decapsulation, a path
engine for route management and verification, a name lookup
engine for SAINT name queries, and a TRC engine, which
allows users to obtain and verify TRC files.
Traffic generated by the applications is delivered to the
SAINT daemon by the NetFilter queue, allowing legacy ap-
plications to deploy SAINT without requiring any changes.
We ran our simulation on an Intel Core i5-3380M CPU at
2.90 GHz, 16 GB of RAM, Python 3.4, and gcc 4.8.2. We
used ed25519 [8] as our signature scheme for name and path
verification, and RSA-2048 for TLS certificates.
10.2 TRC Updates
We measured the efficiency of TRC distribution and updates
by simulating the propagation through the current AS topol-
ogy. We used the CAIDA inferred AS relationships dataset
from October 2014 [2] as our model of the current topol-
ogy, and used traceroutes from iPlane datasets3 to estimate
inter-AS latency. From each of iPlane’s vantage point ASes
(distributed throughout the world), we identified the latency
(half of the RTT) to each of the top-tier Ases identified using
the CAIDA-based topology.
Our evaluation demonstrates that more than half of our
vantage point ASes receive a new TRC file within 100 ms
of the file being sent from the core ISPs (see Figure 13).
Moreover, all vantage point ASes receive the new TRC file
within 600 ms. Our vantage point ASes included stub ASes
3http://iplane.cs.washington.edu/data/data.html
Measurement Min Max Med Avg
DNS resolution 199 967 557 500
Path verification 348 1 691 691 652
Certificate validation (TLS) 210 1 123 222 233
Certificate validation (TLS+CRL) 401 1 775 440 460
Figure 14: Evaluation results (in microseconds).
(that is, ASes with no customer ASes), demonstrating that
end users around the world can quickly receive updated TRC
files. These results show that our TRC propagation mecha-
nism is significantly more efficient than the current trust root
update mechanisms in browsers (which typically occur on
the order of days).
10.3 Authentication Overhead and Performance
To test the actual latency of authentication in SAINT, we
measured 300 end-to-end secure connection establishments
on a sample SCION topology of virtual machines. Figure 14
shows the timing results, which only reflect the cryptographic
verifications and do not take into account network delay,
since a full network deployment of SCION is not available
at this time. However, our results give us an insight into the
overhead of SAINT. In particular, all functions take less than
1 ms on average, which is significantly less than the end-to-
end round trip time in an actual connection establishment.
As a baseline, we measured end-to-end connection estab-
lishments to 100 HTTPS sites on the current Internet ran-
domly selected from httpsnow.org. We observed 418 sep-
arate TLS connection establishments. Using DNSSEC, BG-
PSEC, and TLS, we measured the latency of the total page
loading time, which included blocking of the connection re-
quest, the DNS lookup, the connect, send, and wait, and re-
ceive times, and the TLS handshake. The observed latencies
ranged from 15 ms to 7 969 ms, with an average of 534 ms
and a median of 1 811 ms. For SAINT, we assumed that
a path lookup has an equivalent latency to a DNS query
(one round trip), fast cryptography is used in verification
(ed25519), and an average of 8 keys are authenticated during
the DNS and routing lookups. In this setting, we observed
latencies ranging from 19 ms to 7 974 ms, with an average
of 586 ms and a median of 1 863 ms. These latencies are
not based on a full deployment of SAINT, but indicate a rea-
sonable 10% increase in connection latency on average as
compared to the current Internet.
11. DEPLOYING SAINT
We now discuss several deployment challenges for SAINT
and propose several solutions to facilitate the deployment
of SAINT in the current Internet. Specifically, we discuss
SAINT’s interoperability with the current Internet, and de-
scribe how ISDs can be initially deployed. We then propose
a method for the initial distribution of TRC files.
The Legacy ISD. To facilitate the incremental deployment
of SAINT, we propose a special ISD called the legacy ISD
L, which represents the set of all domains that have not
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yet joined a SAINT ISD. For example, suppose that a.com
maps to the IP address 1.2.3.4 in the current Internet, which
is located in AS 567, which has not yet deployed SAINT.
The domain a.com would then correspond to the address
(L,567,1.2.3.4). The security guarantees for names, routes,
and EE certificates in the legacy ISD are only as strong as
they are in today’s Internet.
One challenge we face in practice is that names in SAINT’s
generic TLDs may already exist in the legacy ISD. Not only
do such collisions cause a problem for name resolution, but
they also create vulnerabilities to downgrade attacks in SAINT’s
name lookup mechanism, since an adversary could simply
return an unsecured DNS response in the legacy ISD for a
query with a name collision. We therefore require SAINT
name resolvers to query the legacy ISD as a last resort, and
only with a proof of the name’s absence in the SAINT names-
pace (such as an NSEC3 record).
Interoperability. SAINT is designed with a focus on incre-
mental deployability. ISDs can be deployed among individ-
ual networks, since the remainder of the Internet that has not
yet deployed SAINT joins the the legacy ISD. The naming
infrastructure is interoperable with that of the current Inter-
net in that it can query the legacy DNS nameservers as is
done today. Routing between two physically separated do-
mains in SCION can utilize IP tunneling to communicate
over the legacy ISD.
In order to maintain connectivity to the current Internet,
servers and clients must support legacy authentication. In
particular, clients and servers must continue to support DNSSEC,
BGPSEC, and TLS. Additionally, when servers receive in-
coming connections from the legacy ISD, they should not
respond with SAINT-specific messages such as signed path
sets or cross-signing certificates. However, TRC files will
be made available through the legacy ISD in order to sup-
port the initial bootstrapping of trust roots.
ISD Deployment. SAINT offers benefits even for early de-
ployers of ISDs. A single-ISD deployment of SAINT pro-
vides isolation of compromises within that ISD. Addition-
ally, the legacy ISD will be protected from compromised
trust roots in every ISD deploying SAINT. Moreover, ISDs
deploying SAINT enjoy greater flexibility in their choice of
alternative PKIs by enabling the benefits of the PKIs without
requiring their global deployment. In the policy field of the
TRC file, an ISD would specify its choice of the underlying
PKI, which would prevent protocol downgrade attacks.
If using countries as ISDs, then a newly-deploying ISD
can simply attach to the existing namespace at its corre-
sponding ccTLD. This construction allows the DNS to pro-
vide a scaffolding during the deployment of SAINT and also
allows the DNS in SAINT to distribute TRC files.
However, we recognize the challenges that come with us-
ing countries as ISDs. In particular, the deployment of such
a scheme would require the core ISPs, root CAs, and Inter-
net registries in each country to create a federation of trust
roots. In practice, we may see corporations rather than coun-
tries form ISDs. In this case, ISDs would have to form IP
tunnels in order to form inter-ISD routing relationships. Ad-
ditionally, since there are far more corporations than coun-
tries, cross-signing relationships may not scale to this num-
ber of ISDs. However, because most corporations do not
form many business relationships relative to the number of
corporations that exist, we do not expect that the number
of cross-signing relationships will grow to an unsustainable
scale.
TRC Distribution. The initial distribution of TRCs must
occur securely since TRCs are the starting point for all au-
thentication in SAINT. Many trust roots in the current In-
ternet may continue to serve as trust roots in SAINT, and
thus may be able to “inherit” user trust in SAINT that they
already have in the current Internet. However, SAINT will
likely result in the creation of new trust roots, and thus must
have a mechanism for bootstrapping trust in the initial public
keys of these roots.
To address this challenge, we suggest to perform the initial
distribution of SAINT TRC files through DNSSEC. Since
ISDs can deploy by attaching to specific ccTLDs in the cur-
rent DNS namespace, an ISD can create a reserved domain
name such as trc.us, whose DNS record contains the TRC
(e.g., in a TXT record). Clients can then fetch the TRC
by looking up the appropriate domain name. Additional
work has been done in distributing authentication informa-
tion through out-of-band means such as over public radio [36],
but these strategies are beyond the scope of this paper.
12. DISCUSSION
Feasibility of country-based ISDs. In order to determine
the feasibility of having countries as ISDs in SAINT as de-
scribed in Section 4.1, we mapped AS numbers to countries
and examined the resulting inter-ISD relationships. We used
the AS relationships database from CAIDA [2] and Team
Cymru’s IP to AS number mapping tool,4 to map AS num-
bers to countries. We identified 228 “countries” in total,
including the EU and ZZ (indicating that the AS’s country
was unknown). We identified 2 636 unique country pairs be-
tween which an inter-AS link existed. These links signify
direct routing connections, and thus we expect cross-signing
for each ISD pair. The most prolific cross-signing ISDs were
the US (196), the EU (135), and the UK (124), but half of
the ISDs cross-sign on the order of tens of other ISDs.
Political Concerns. Given concerns over governmental nation-
wide surveillance, readers may worry about centralizing trust
roots in a large ISD. While we acknowledge that states may
compromise these entities on a large scale, SAINT’s trust
agility allows users to protect themselves from the inter-
ception of sensitive connections. Additionally, our efficient
method of updating trust root information allows ISDs to
quickly recover from a compromised CA.
4http://www.team-cymru.org/Services/ip-to-asn.html
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Another concern we anticipate is that SAINT encourages
fragmentation in the Internet. While this is true, SAINT
is designed to preserve global reachability while simulta-
neously protecting users through the use of ISDs and trust
agility. We thus structure inter-ISD authentication to pro-
vide users with the best of both worlds.
Sub-ISDs. To add further scalability to SAINT, we propose
the use of sub-ISDs, i.e., ISDs being completely contained
in other ISDs. A sub-ISD can be used to provide additional
policies and finer-grained control of trust roots in an ISD,
and can additionally enable isolated authentication within
an ISD. For example, governments or medical organizations
may use their own network within a country ISD to ensure
data privacy and further scope the authority of their trust
roots.
A sub-ISD structurally resembles a top-level ISD, but au-
thenticates to other sub-ISDs in the same parent ISD using
the core of the parent ISD, and has its trust roots of a cer-
tified by its parent ISD via a cross-signing certificate. Con-
nections within an ISD could then be negotiated using the
lowest-level common ISD. For example, two hospitals in an
ISD would share data about a patient using the medical sub-
ISD rather than the general ISD.
Some details regarding authentication for sub-ISDs still
remain, however. For example, compromised trust roots could
also affect authentication entirely within a sub-ISD due to
the requirement that parent ISDs certify the trust roots of
their sub-ISDs. Furthermore, users cannot select sub-ISDs
as their trust anchor ISDs without also trusting the corre-
sponding parent ISDs. We hope to investigate these chal-
lenges in future work.
Optimizations. As described in Section 9, the authentica-
tion process involves six round-trip connections from Alice.
Each communication with the path server requires verifica-
tion of the path server’s signature, the signed set of routing
paths returned by the path server, the destination AS cer-
tificate, and possibly cross-signing certificates for the path
server and destination AS’s ISDs. To contact a destination
outside her trust anchor ISD, Alice must also obtain and ver-
ify a cross-signing certificate. Contacting the DNS server re-
quires verification of at least the DNS root key, server DNS
key, and signed DNS record, and contacting the server (Bob)
requires verification of at least the server certificate.
However, in practice many of these verifications may not
be necessary. Caching cross-signing certificates, for exam-
ple, eliminates the need to reach a TRC server and to verify a
cross-signing certificate with each end-to-end connection es-
tablishment. Additionally, some of these verifications can be
handled by entities other than the client; for example, paths
can be verified by the client’s AS, and DNS records by a
trusted DNS stub resolver. Since ASes and stub resolvers
serve multiple clients, caching verification results can fur-
ther reduce the connection latency, especially for popular
names, routes, and EE certificates.
In order to further decrease the size of messages sent in
the network, we can also split the TRC file into routing and a
service TRC files. The routing TRC can then be propagated
along AS links, and the service TRC can be obtained from
the TRC server. This scheme ensures that users only receive
the portion of the TRC that they need for a particular type
of authentication, thus reducing the size of TRC files sent in
the network.
13. RELATED WORK
This section provides related work supplemental to the work
mentioned in Section 2. Many such works propose mech-
anisms to authenticate network entities. We review these
works with regards to domain-centric proposals as well as
authentication for naming, routing, and EE certification.
Domain-centric proposals. The idea of aggregating hosts
and routers into an abstracted routing entity has been previ-
ously proposed. The Nimrod routing architecture [11] de-
scribes a hierarchy of “clusters” of hosts, routers, or net-
works that can reach each other via a path contained within
the cluster. FARA [13] generalizes the notion of an “entity”
to also include clusters of computers that can be reached as
a network communication endpoint. ISDs in SAINT fit the
criteria for clusters in Nimrod, but add a set of common trust
roots as well as the constraint that all intra-domain paths
must be contained within the ISD.
Name authentication. Previous work has addressed au-
thentication in a distributed, large scale network without any
global trust infrastructure. Birrell et al. [9] propose to use an
authenticated path through the name space to make explicit
trust relationships among entities, and Lampson et al. [25]
describe an authentication theory based on the name space
or the communication channel from which the other entity’s
authority can be deduced. Gligor et al. [19] define a policy
for inter-realm authentication trust based on trust hierarchies
that can support transparent name authentication.
Routing authentication. AIP [7] provides accountability
for network entities based on self-certifying names, where
the name of an entity is its public key [33–35, 39]. AIP
groups an independent administrative network into an ac-
countability domain (AD) and assigned globally unique self-
certifying names to ADs and hosts. Consequently, at the AD
granularity, AIP not only supports routing and forwarding
authentication, but also domain authentication without rely-
ing on an external PKI. However, key discovery in AIP re-
lies on DNSSEC, and key revocations always force entities
to change their names.
IPA [30] focuses on incremental deployment in the current
Internet and leverages DNSSEC as a lightweight PKI to en-
able host authentication. IPA distributes AS certificates via
S-BGP routing update messages, avoiding circular depen-
dencies. However, it relies in a single global root of trust.
End-entity authentication. Several proposals raise issues
with the current domain authentication schemes based on
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X.509 and propose enhancements. For example, CAge [22]
proposes to restrict CAs to signing domains in a small num-
ber of TLDs and treat other certificates as suspicious, and
the US government has also recently considered this pro-
posal [1]. Abadi et al. suggest a policy engine to empower
clients or ISPs to specify acceptance criteria for certificates [6].
Although the authors outline a promising user-oriented en-
tity authentication policy, its integration in the end-user sys-
tem is still in question.
DANE [21] leverages the DNSSEC infrastructure to au-
thenticate TLS public keys. Its goals are to tie TLS public
keys to DNS names, use DNS to distribute these public keys,
and to leverage the hierarchical authentication structure of
DNSSEC to restrict the scope of CAs’ authority. However,
the security of DANE relies on the security of DNSSEC. A
compromised DNSSEC key can be used to specify arbitrary
trust anchors and bypass X.509 certificate validation.
Certificate Transparency (CT) [26] and the Accountable
Key Infrastructure (AKI) [24] expose all CA operations to
the public to improve the security of SSL/TLS PKIs. Neither
CT nor AKI define how misbehavior should be disseminated
to users and other parties, but both can be deployed in ISDs,
which leverage TRC files to quickly remove a compromised
trust root and update users’ trust root information.
14. CONCLUSIONS
By explicitly separating and scoping trusted authorities in
the Internet, we allow users to choose their trust roots and
protect users from compromises throughout the Internet. By
distributing trust root information as network messages, we
allow users to quickly obtain up-to-date information about
compromised or updated trust roots. By mandating cross-
signing relationships based on routing connections, we en-
sure that users can authenticate information throughout the
Internet. By separating routing and service authentication,
we allow users’ trust root decisions to apply anywhere in
the world. These ideas address fundamental shortcomings
of current authentication and secure Alice’s communications
throughout the world regardless of her choice of trust roots.
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APPENDIX
DNS Resolution for Generic TLDs
As stated in Section 5.2, for reasons of transparency and security,
each domain name with a generic TLD is resolved to a regional
domain name (rather than to an address). Assume, for example, a
company r wants to register the domain r.com. Instead of regis-
tering a DNS tuple (r.com, IP), the company registers one or more
CNAME-like records5 that point to other (usually regional) domain
names:
r.com → {r.us, r.de, r-swiss.ch, r-italia.it} (1)
Upon a DNS resolution request for a generic domain D from a
client, the DNS server for .com returns all regional names for D
in the order specified by the registrant r. The client then either
chooses a domain name that is within its own ISD, or it chooses
any other domain name in the provided list.
5CNAME records cannot point to multiple names, but the general
idea of our records is the same.
In order to ensure the authenticity of generic DNS records, SAINT
requires a minimal setup as follows: any registrant r must first reg-
ister its DNS public key DKr with the generic DNS server S.
r DKr−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ S (.com)
S stores and signs the public key DKr, and returns the signature
{r,DKr}K−1S .
r
{r,DKr}K−1S←−−−−−−−−−−−−−− S (.com)
After this initial step, registrant r registers its domain name D by
providing the list of regional domain names {...} together with a
signature {D,{. . .}}DK−1r .
r
{D,{...}}
DK−1r−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ S (.com)
Verification. This domain-specific signature is verified whenever
a client c wants to authenticate a DNS response for a generic do-
main D.
c D?−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ S (.com)
{D,{...}} {D,{...}}
DK−1r
DKr {r,DKr}K−1S←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
The client verifies the signature {r,DKr}K−1S and caches the public
verification key DKr of the registrant r of domain D. The client
then verifies the authenticity of the record {D,{. . .}} using the reg-
istrant’s public key DKr.
If the verification was successful, the client choses one of the
specified regional domain names and resolves its actual address
(I,A,E).
Performance. As in the current DNSSEC, the DNS server S for
generic TLDs does not sign the stored CNAME-like records itself;
rather, it signs the public keys of the registrants. The reasons in-
clude performance considerations: whenever a registrant r wants
to register a new generic domain or whenever r wants to extend
an existing record, the DNS server has minimal effort in that it
does not need to validate or sign the new records. Using CNAME-
like records also keeps the performance close to existing lookups:
CNAME records add only 13% latency to a DNS name resolution
on average.6
Availability. Whenever a client needs to resolve a generic domain
name, the client first contacts its local DNS server. If the local
DNS server has no cached entry for the generic domain, the re-
quest is redirected to the DNS server of the generic TLD. This one
step of indirection is at least as robust as today’s DNS system: in
case the DNS server for a generic domain is unavailable, then only
the availability of that single TLD is constricted. There is hence no
single point of failure for the entire DNS system. As today, caching
of generic domain name records by local DNS servers further in-
creases the robustness and performance for generic DNS lookups.
Security. The record for a generic domain D is signed by the owner
of D (i.e., the registrant r) using an asymmetric signature scheme
and the private signing key of r. The public verification key of r is
signed by r’s ISD and by the DNS server for .com. Client C can
hence base its trust on the ISD of r or (in case C does not trust this
ISD) on the DNS server for .com.
Another positive aspect of this design is the fact that a key com-
promise of .com’s DNS server does not directly affect the security
of an end-to-end connection: an attacker would additionally need to
6This result is based on our private discussions with Verisign Labs.
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compromise the DNS server of a regional ISD, which is used for the
second lookup, the regional lookup for the actual address (I,A,E).
Despite being unlikely, this attack only works under the assump-
tion that a client uses the verification key of .com (rather than the
verification key of the resolved regional CNAME domain).
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